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Sham of the Moral Court? 
Testimony sold as the Spoils of War.  [1/2011] 
Mark Findlay1 & Sylvia Ngane2
 
 
Abstract 
This paper analyses the critical influences on witness-based truth telling for judicial decision-making in the 
international criminal tribunals. The judicial fixation on witness testimony reflects the weight and legitimacy given 
to personal testimony before international courts. This weight must be balanced by awareness that a witness may 
provide false testimony intentionally, or may be coaxed by third parties to provide such testimony as has been 
evidenced recently before the ICC. If witness testimony is tainted then its capacity to endorse the truth finding 
function of the court is compromised.  As a consequence to assert that the tribunal is a ‘moral court’ in such 
circumstances is jeopardized.   
The nexus between witness testimony, truth, the morality of judicial determinations, and the legitimacy this affords 
is explored in what follows.  We question whether simple assertions that witness testimony, tested through 
adversarial examination, produces truth and morality are all they seem.  The analysis also critiques the reality of 
witness testimony before the international tribunals. 
Ultimately the paper suggests that while truthful testimony is crucial if international criminal trials are to produce 
legitimate judicial determinations, the naïve claim to a moral court as a consequence of tested witness testimony is 
problematic at least and unsustainable at best.  
The paper elaborates on a fundamental conflict underpinning prosecutorial influence over witness testimony which 
is a natural outcome of how witnesses are sourced and of their expectations.  This conflict not only goes to explain 
unreliable testimony, but also prosecutorial reluctance to advance contempt proceedings. In addition, we question, 
while contempt is a useful to control perjury, whether the confusion of witnesses in international courts about what 
they are meant to say and why, mitigates an absolutist approach to liability for lying in the witness box. 
The central question is whether witness testimony is a genuine legitimator of the moral court or are the problematic 
circumstances surrounding witness testimony strong challenges to the moral court assertion, which need to be 
addressed before any such claim can be confidently and convincingly argued. 
Introduction 
Witness testimony is powerful and juridically commended evidence on which trial decision-making is 
legitimately grounded. Oral testimony plays a strong normative role in the international criminal trial 
when truth-telling is apparently confirmed through procedural protections like balanced cross 
examination and punishment for false testimony.3
                                                          
1 Professor of Law, Singapore Management University; Professor of Criminal Justice, University of  Sydney; 
Professor of International Criminal Justice, University of Leeds. 
  
2 Doctoral Scholar, Law School, University of Leeds. 
3 A former judge at the ICTY Patricia Wald has described witnesses in war crimes tribunal proceedings as precious 
commodities. Nonetheless, the legitimacy of witness testimony is determined by legal professionals on its credibility 
for establishing the truth before the tribunals.  Patricia M. Wald, ‘Dealing With Witnesses in War Crime Trials: 
Lessons from the Yugoslav Tribunal’, 5 Yale Human Rights & Development Law Journal (2002) 217,  238-239 
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Confirming oral testimony as truth-telling and thereby the foundation of moral judgement, the ability of 
international trial judges to assess the veracity of witness testimony is normatively and practically crucial, 
and unusually difficult.4  According to International Criminal Court (ICC) judges there will be little, if 
any advantage, to evidence being given in toto orally, if its truth is untested by limited challenge or where 
the testimony is not of central evidentiary and factual significance.5
This paper analyses the critical influences on witness-based truth-telling for judicial decision-making in 
the international criminal tribunals. The judicial fixation on witness testimony reflects the weight and 
legitimacy given to personal testimony before international courts. This weight must be balanced by 
awareness that a witness may provide false testimony intentionally or may be coaxed by third parties to 
fabricate a story, as has been evidenced recently before the International Criminal Court (ICC). If witness 
testimony is tainted then its capacity to endorse the truth finding function of the court is compromised.  
As a consequence, the claim that the tribunal is a ‘moral court’ in such circumstances is undermined, if at 
all otherwise confirmed.   
 Realising the vulnerability of oral 
testimony without active adversarial confirmation underscores the concern of courts in any  unquestioning 
reliance on witness testimony as the truthful foundation of moral judicial decision-making for securely 
resting the declaratory purpose of international criminal trials. 
The nexus between witness testimony, truth, the morality of judicial determinations, and the legitimacy 
this affords international trial justice, is explored in what follows.  We question whether simple assertions 
that witness testimony, tested through adversarial examination produces truth and morality, are all they 
seem.  The analysis also critiques the nature and reality of witness testimony before the international 
tribunals against the following practical issues: 
• What sort of witnesses appear? 
• How are they sourced? 
• What are their expectations about testifying? 
• What inducements have they been offered? 
• Do the prosecutors represent the interests of their witnesses? 
• Is ‘truth’ distilled through the adversarial process? 
• Is ‘truth’ in the eye of the beholder? 
• If testimony is not truthful should it always be met with contempt prosecutions? 
• Why are prosecutors not going down that path? 
• Can the claims for a moral court rest on assumptions about the ‘truth’ of witness testimony? 
• Do the conditions of the trial and the nature of witnesses before it compromise truthful 
testimony? 
• Does the adversarial system fail to confirm truth? 
Ultimately the paper suggests that while truthful testimony is crucial if international criminal trials are to 
produce legitimate judicial determinations, the naïve assertion of a moral court as a consequence of tested 
witness testimony is problematic at least and unsustainable at best. In addition, the confluence of interests 
                                                          
4 Joshua Karton, ‘Lost in Translation: International criminal tribunals and the legal implications of interpreted 
testimony’ 1 Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law (2008) 38 
5 Lubanga, decision on the prosecutions application for the admission of the prior recorded statements of two 
witnesses 15 January 2009 para 22 
3 
 
operating against the truthful witness 6
The paper elaborates on a fundamental conflict underpinning prosecutorial influence over witness 
testimony which is a natural outcome of how witnesses are sourced and of their expectations.  This 
conflict not only goes to explain unreliable testimony, but also prosecutorial reluctance to advance 
contempt proceedings. In addition, we question, while contempt is legally presumed useful to control 
perjury, whether the confusion and compromise of witnesses in international courts about what they are 
meant to say and why, mitigates an absolutist approach to liability for lying in the witness box. 
, and ineffective or defective procedural protections make the 
achievement of truth through oral testimony unpredictable and indeterminant.  
The central question in our argument is whether witness testimony is a genuine legitimator of the moral 
court, or rather if the problematic circumstances surrounding witness testimony are strong challenges to 
the moral court assertion. If truthful testimony is frequently problematic, can we disambiguate in the 
context of international trial justice, the claimed nexus between oral testimony and moral legitimacy? And 
if it is not the certainty truthful testimony then what remains on which aspirations for a moral court can 
rest? 
In summary, the moral court exemplar claims and offers legitimacy through truth; truth enunciated in oral 
testimony and supposedly refined through the fire of adversarial fact finding. An examination of the 
international case law where false testimony is evident demands the question, whose truth? Is oral 
testimony a vehicle for victim truth telling, or a device to legitimate trial adjudication? The structural and 
functional incentives for witnesses to compromise truth in international criminal trials must be exposed 
along with conflicts of interest prosecutor/witness if the determination is to be made, moral or otherwise, 
who is the court for?  Venturing this question will reveal the strain between adversarial trial and 
restorative victim-centred justice as the subjectivised motive and outcome of bearing witness. Also, 
adversarial/procedural truth protections may not cure either the interests to lie, or expose the lies 
themselves. 
Legitimacy will be restored for the international trial process not by mimicking truth and concealing its 
compromise through flawed witness testimony.  In order to put morality back into the court it is necessary 
beyond contempt show trials to challenge problematic representations of truth, through understanding the 
complexity of victim interests and expectations for trial justice and their part within it. This, we suggest, 
will have a more long-lasting impact than punitive sanctioning, or sharper procedural protections, which 
can play their part in this restoration. 
International trial judges seem aware of what lies behind compromised witness testimony and tend to 
discount it rather than seeking its depiction through contempt proceedings. Therefore, the real 
considerations here ask; is truth a challenge to the moral court when based on compromised victim 
testimony – truth beyond procedural form – and is contempt prosecution the solution? 
Importance of testamentary evidence before the international tribunals  
Present day international courts and tribunals have relied overwhelmingly on witness testimony 
recounting critical events in order to decide allegations of criminal conduct and to deliver guilty verdicts 
that the international community will consider just and truthful. At the Ad hoc, hybrid tribunals and now 
the ICC there is an overwhelming reliance on testamentary evidence as a source of fact. Much of the 
testimony comes from victim witnesses. 
                                                          
6 We do not have the opportunity here to interrogate the subjective nature and interpretation of truth but it is an 
important consideration when truth is objectified as moral decision-making. 
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Unlike in the former military tribunals, contemporary international criminal justice has increased its focus 
on the needs and interests of witnesses in justice and trial practice.  The Treaties, Rules of Procedures and 
Evidence (RPE) and Regulations of these tribunals indicate how such legitimate interests should be met 
and also what is the proper treatment of witnesses, before, during and after their testimony.  In addition, 
these instruments impose responsibilities and duties on witnesses, as well as the threat of sanctions if they 
are in breach of accepted truthful conduct while providing testimony.  
Witness testimony now counts as the most important source of evidence in international criminal law.7 
This has been recognized by the Judges of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia 
(ICTY), yet expressing the fear that many victims and witnesses would be deterred from testifying about 
the crimes committed by the negative consequences their testimony will bring to themselves or their 
relatives. Unlike the Nuremberg Tribunal experience, prosecutions at the ICTY have become to a 
considerable degree be dependent on eyewitness testimony.8 This could be illustrated for instance in 
Tadic, where up until the closing, the judges heard 126 witnesses 76 for the prosecution, 40 for the 
defence and then an additional 10 for the prosecution in rebuttal.9 In volume alone this would tend to 
confirm the importance placed on oral testimony by legal professionals in achieving their decision-
making goals. Similarly, the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) relies primarily on 
witness testimonies to render judgments.10
The ICC Judges ruled in Katanga et al that in principle, witnesses testify to what he or she remembers 
having observed,
  
11 and a witness is a person who on oath or solemn affirmation gives evidence in any 
cause or matter. 12  Due to the nature of the charges against accused persons, prosecutions are to a 
considerable degree dependent on victim witness13
However, there is more to the important positioning of oral testimony than trial decision-making utility. 
The morality of resultant judicial decision-making is claimed through a number of testimonial 
assumptions and relationships. For instance, witnesses have declared it was their moral duty to testify 
before the ICTY.  As one witness put it:  
 testimony, and even so the witness is expected to give 
evidence in the interest of justice rather than for revenge.  
                                                          
7 See Sylvia Ngane, ‘Witnesses before the International Criminal Court’, The Law and Practice of International 
Courts and Tribunals 8 (2009) 431-457 p.432at pp 432-433 
8 Prosecutor v. Tadic Decision on the Prosecution’s Motion Requesting Protective Measures for Victims and 
Witnesses, Case No. IT-94-1-T, 10 August 1995, para. 23.  
9 See opinion and judgement , Prosecutor  v. Tadic , Case No. IT-94-1-T, T. Ch. II, 7, May 1997 , paras 28-35; see 
also Fourth Annual Report of the ICTY  (1997), paras.21-24; See Sixth Annual Report of the ICTY (1999) para.17 ; 
See Judgment Prosecutor v. Blaskic, Case No. IT-95-14-T, T.Ch.II, 3 March 2000, para.19  Goran Sluiter 
International Criminal Adjudication and the Collection of Evidence: Obligations of States (Antwerp, Oxford, New 
York: Intersentia, 2002) p.233; Mark B. Harmon, Fergal Gaynor, ‘Prosecuting Massive Crimes with Primative 
Tools: Three Difficulties Encountered by Prosecutors in International Criminal Proceedings’ Journal of 
International Criminal Justice 2004, 403-426 
10 See Richard May, ‘The Collection and Admissibility of Evidence and the Rights of the Accused, in Justice for Crimes 
Against Humanity’ 161, 165 (Mark Lattimer & Philippe Sands eds., 2003); Joanna Pozen, Justice Obscured: The Non-
Disclosure of Witnesses' Identities in ICTR Trials, New York University Journal of International Law and Politics, 
2005-2006 281 at 281; Francois-Xavier Nsanzuwera, ‘The ICTR Contribution to National Reconciliation,  Journal of 
International Criminal Justice, 2005,  944 
11 Prosecutor v. Katanga et al, Directions for the conduct of the proceedings and testimony in accordance with rule 
140, ICC-01/04-01/07, 01 December 2009, Para 109 (hereinafter Katanga directions in accordance with rule 140) 
12 See J.E Penner, Mozley &Whiteley’s Law Dictionary 12th edition (Butterworths 2001) p. 388 
13 We use the notion of victim witnesses beyond direct victimisation and to include communities of victims or 
communities in which victimisation was witnessed. 
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It was my wish, my desire, and my moral obligation to my family to testify.14
Principal among the reasons for the importance of testamentary evidence in international criminal justice 
is the need to justify through the truthful assertion of the witness, judicial decision-making and outcomes 
as confirming a ‘moral court’ institution. In this respect ‘truth’ legitimates morality and vice versa. Truth 
is presumed to be the essential consequence of adversarial witness testimony legitimating as moral, 
judicial decision-making.   
  
As features of common law procedure grafted into the international criminal trial, oral testimony and 
adversarial examination synthesize a grand notion of truth in an environment of fundamental due process 
and procedural fairness (such as participation in hearings and challenging the accuser).  To confirm these 
procedures as assets for trial decision-making two assumptions need to prevail: 
1. That the vast majority of witness testimony will be truthful or at least accurate, and 
2. For that small portion or inaccurate testimony, vigorous professional examination will expose the 
flaws and enable at the very least, judicial discounting. 
Experientially from the first trial before the ICC, and many before the international criminal tribunals, 
neither of these assumptions holds true in all circumstances.  Particularly with a limited role for defence 
cross-examination and the constrained dimensions of the defence case to unwind flawed prosecution 
testimony in international trials, the basic protections of exposing false testimony cannot be relied on.  As 
a result, the due process rights available to the accused are blunted.  Add to this, more flexible rules 
governing the presentation of evidence, and the filter of false testimony is further compromised. 
In civil law traditions, it could be argued, that the detailed interrogation of the investigatory process 
would mean that what oral (and documentary) evidence that eventually gets to trial will be anticipated by 
the judge to have been even more rigorously tested than common law witness evidence.  The ICC 
prosecutor enjoys much of the civil law investigatory dimension.  Even the Office of the Prosecutor 
(OTP) does not benefit from a global police force, and may work in areas where corroborating evidence, 
particularly documentary, is more difficult to uncover, this is not due to a lack of investigatory power.  
The experience revealed in Lubanga regarding investigation methods, suggests that judges could not 
universally rely on the veracity of prosecution evidence in a similar way that their civil law colleagues 
might expect. 
In order to appreciate the connection between truthful witness testimony and the procedural protection of 
contempt it is necessary first to critically analyse court-based contempt sanctioning.  Doing this for the 
international criminal tribunals reveals that as a procedural action contempt seems practically not of much 
importance.  If contempt is significant (even as a deterrent) to ensure morality and legality then it is up to 
those making the assertion to explain this judicial and prosecutorial inactivity, against the ambiguous role 
of witness testimony. 
Essential to such an enquiry is analysing and clarifying the different types of witnesses before the ICC 
and their sourcing. In so doing it becomes possible to speculate on the competing interests which may 
influence the nature and form of witness testimony and thereby contextualize the juridical decision 
whether or not to treat untruthful testimony with contempt prosecution. 
Modelling witness types can be approached either from the perspective of what testimony they can offer 
(for instance crime-based, victim or expert witnesses), or in terms of their sourcing. 
                                                          
14 Eric Stover The Witnesses: War Crimes and the Promise of Justice in The Hague Human Rights Center 
University of California, Berkeley May 2003 pp. 55-73 
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Challenging truth - Modelling witnesses15
There are at least two types of witnesses from the stand-point of what they attest; crime-based witnesses 
(often victims) and expert witnesses.
 before the ICC  
16
Crime-based witnesses  
  
Crime-based witnesses, also known as eye-witnesses testify according to what they have seen, heard, felt 
or who have been victims of a crime.17  Victim or vulnerable witnesses may be child soldiers, sexual and 
gender crime witnesses, war affected juvenile or child witnesses and other victims of crime.18 Additional 
witnesses may include character witnesses, government officials, staff from international and non-
governmental organisations, suspect19, insider witness,20 intermediaries,21
The rules of evidenced as applied by the international criminal tribunals have set a far more flexible 
standard as to what witnesses may attest than might be the case say in common law trial traditions.  
Hearsay, for instance, does not always present a barrier to admissibility where evidence is presented on 
behalf of say community experience. 
 military personnel, guards etc.  
Expert witnesses 
Expert witnesses testify by virtue of some specialised knowledge, skill or training can assist with facts to 
understand or determine an issue in dispute.22
                                                          
15 A witness could be defined as any person who is potentially able to provide the Court with information about an 
alleged offence committed under the Statute or information which supports the defence exculpatory evidence or who 
has specialised knowledge to determine an issue in dispute.  The Rome Statute15 and the Rules of Procedure and 
Evidence (RPE)15 do not provide for a definition of ‘witness’. However, this omission may be explained by the 
essential and traditional role of the witness in procedural traditions where oral testimony prevails. 
 The parties in the ICC may rely on the following kinds of 
16 See Sylvia Ngane, ‘Witnesses before the International Criminal Court’, The Law and Practice of International 
Courts and Tribunals 8 (2009) 431-457 p.432 
17 See Prosecutor v. Strugar, Decision on the Defence Motions to Oppose Admission of Prosecution 
Expert Reports Pursuant to Rule 94 bis, Case No. IT-01-42-T, T. Ch. II, 1 April 2004, p. 4; 
Prosecutor v. Brdanin, Decision on Prosecution’s Submission of Statement of Expert Witness 
Ewan Brown, Case No. IT-99-36-T, T. Ch. II, 3 June 2003, p. 4; Prosecutor v. Galic, Decision on 
the Expert Witness Statements Submitted by the Defence, Case No. IT-98-29-T, T. Ch. I, 27 
January 2003, p. 3; Prosecutor v. Norman et al., Decision on Prosecution Request for Leave to 
Call Additional Witnesses and for Orders for Protective Measures, Case No. SCSL-04-14-T, 
T. Ch. I, 21 June 2005, p. 4; Prosecutor v. Akayesu, Decision by a Defence Motion for the 
Appearance of an Accused as an Expert Witness, Case No. ICTR-96-04-T, Trial Chamber I, 
9 March 1998, p. 2; Claus Kress, ‘Witnesses in Proceedings Before the International Criminal 
Court’, in Horst Fischer, Claus Kress & Sascha Rolf Luder (eds.), International and National 
Prosecution of Crimes under International Law; Current Developments (Berlin: Verlag Arno Spitz GMBH 2001) 
pp. 309–383 at pp. 315–317. 
18 See Rule 85(2) 
19  Not considered in this research 
20  Mark B. Harmon & Fergal Gaynor, Prosecuting Massive Crimes with Primitive tools: Three Difficulties 
Encountered by Prosecutors in International Criminal Proceedings  (2004) Journal of International Criminal Justice 
403-426 
21Prosecutor v. Lubanga Decision on Intermediaries ICC-01/04-01/06 , 31 May 2010 para 50  
22   See Prosecutor v. Strugar, Decision on the Defence Motions to Oppose Admission of Prosecution 
Expert Reports Pursuant to Rule 94 bis, Case No. IT-01-42-T, T. Ch. II, 1 April 2004, p. 4; 
Prosecutor v. Brdanin, Decision on Prosecution’s Submission of Statement of Expert Witness 
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expert witnesses, an overview expert witness, a gender crime expert witness, a military expert witness, an 
expert on names and a socio-linguistic expert witness. 23
Besides these two broad classes of witness, the unique feature of witness identity in international criminal 
tribunals is the significance of the victim.
 
24
 First-hand knowledge – revenge motivation – this is where the witness has personally 
experienced victimization and has an individual and vested interest in seeing the accused 
responsible 
 Trial advocates and judges have long been aware of the 
problems inherent in testimony coloured by the vulnerable emotions of victimization.  With the over-
reliance on victim witnesses in the international criminal trial the moral justifications for false testimony 
based on victim experience become a predictable motivation for partial or inaccurate accounts.  To 
illustrate this it is useful to break down witness standing relative to proximity to victimization. 
 Second hand knowledge – obligation – situations here would be where the witnesses close family 
or associates have been victimized and they want to act on behalf of family loss and trauma 
 Third hand knowledge – limited recall – in the case of third party victims their capacity to recall 
evidence will be influenced heavily by the immediate ‘popular culture’ surrounding the 
victimization. 
 Representative knowledge – speaking on behalf of communities – in the selection of witnesses it 
is not inconsequential that they are considered the voice of many and thereby collapse the 
collective memory into one story 
 Confusion as to relationship between testimony of fact and making someone responsible – 
peripheral victims who have a commitment to those who have suffered all too often believe it 
their duty to see someone responsible for the collective victimisation 
Sourcing of witnesses 
Due to the fact that the ICC has no separate investigatory arm such as a policing agency to identify and 
test witnesses, the way witnesses are sourced in the international criminal trial is quite different from 
national level practice. In this distinction lies a challenge for the prosecutor in proofing objective witness 
testimony. The ICC Prosecutor finds witnesses through various sources in the field and from there 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
Ewan Brown, Case No. IT-99-36-T, T. Ch. II, 3 June 2003, p. 4; Prosecutor v. Galic, Decision on 
the Expert Witness Statements Submitted by the Defence, Case No. IT-98-29-T, T. Ch. I, 27 
January 2003, p. 3; Prosecutor v. Norman et al., Decision on Prosecution Request for Leave to 
Call Additional Witnesses and for Orders for Protective Measures, Case No. SCSL-04-14-T, 
T. Ch. I, 21 June 2005, p. 4; Prosecutor v. Akayesu, Decision by a Defence Motion for the 
Appearance of an Accused as an Expert Witness, Case No. ICTR-96-04-T, Trial Chamber I, 
9 March 1998, p. 2 
23 Prosecutor v. Bemba Decision on the procedures to be adopted for instructing expert witnesses No. ICC-01/05-
01/08 12 February 2010 para 2; see also Prosecutor v. Bemba Prosecution’s Request for Approval of its Proposed 
Experts and Joint Instructions by the Prosecution and Legal Representatives  No. ICC-01/05-01/08, 28 January 2010 
para 6 (hereinafter Bemba prosecution request); Assembly of States Parties to the Rome Statute of the International 
Criminal Court Seventh session The Hague, Volume II ICC-ASP/7/20, 14 – 22 November 2008  para 123. 
Regulation 44(1) of Regulations of the Court23 provides that the Registrar shall create and maintain a list of experts 
accessible at all times to all organs of the Court and to all participants. Experts shall be included on such a list 
following an appropriate indication of expertise in the relevant field. 
24 In this we mean ‘victims’ who could also be considered removed from the crime. 
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ascertains the location of those witnesses before employing any intermediaries to work on its behalf.25 
Intermediaries’ who may be  local persons or staff from  non-governmental or international organisations 
working in the region of the crime, and are usually in contact with these potential witnesses for purposes 
separate from the courts, connect them with ICC investigators who then obtain their statements. These 
intermediaries essentially facilitate contact with (potential) witnesses 26  almost like agents for the 
prosecution, in particular by providing substantial assistance to the prosecution in the process of obtaining 
witness statements.27
In the Lubanga trial the judges were informed by the OTP that 23 individuals or organisations contacted 
or introduced potential incriminating witnesses to the prosecutors. 
 Conflicts of interest are inevitable. Take for example an NGO that comes in contact 
with child soldiers for humanitarian or health concerns.  The children connect with the NGO for reasons 
which might not be incompatible with the prosecutors but are essentially different in context, nature and 
obligation.  When the children are passed to the prosecutor it is not surprising that they may carry over to 
the new agency similar expectations that they had for the NGO.  They may not be motivated by an 
objective desire to tell the truth in court.  Where they have commonly been offered inducements to speak 
to the prosecutor their understandings of their role will be further confused.  The conflict of interest here 
is both institutional (child/NGO-child/prosecutor) and individual (progressive self interest).  All the legal 
directions in the world by judges at trial will not overcome this prevailing confusion as to role and 
purpose, and eventual reward. 
28 The assistance provided by six 
intermediaries in Lubanga reached half of the prosecution’s trial witnesses". These intermediaries 
undertook tasks in the field that staff members of the OTP could not fulfil without creating suspicion. 
Intermediaries know members of the community, and they have access to information and places that are 
otherwise unavailable to the prosecution.29
A major challenge for the OTP in its investigatory and prosecutorial roles has been witness management. 
The OTP is geographically distant from witnesses. This has constantly affected the regularity of the 
contact investigators and prosecutors can have with witnesses.
  The role of the intermediary was revealed in evidence as 
being crucial in formulating the impressions and expectations that witnesses had of cooperating with 
prosecutors, and what they looked forward to as self-interested outcomes of the court proceedings. 
30
How are witnesses selected? 
 Moreover it has meant an over-reliance 
on intermediaries to establish and maintain essential contact and confidence.  As a consequence the OTP 
is largely unable to guarantee that what passes between intermediaries and witnesses is nothing more than 
encouragement and instructions on evidence delivery and truth-telling.  The tyranny of distance has also 
meant that prosecutors may not have a detailed opportunity to proof witnesses until they arrive at the 
Hague and by this time witness misunderstanding of their role, and consequent conflict of interests may 
be well embedded and deeply concealed. 
In selecting persons to be questioned in connection with an investigation, the Office of the Prosecutor  
(OTP) assesses the person's reliability and gives due consideration to his or her safety and well-being.31
                                                          
25 Prosecutor v. Katanga et al, Transcript, ICC-01/04-01/07-T-81-Red-ENG WT 25-11-2009 NB T.  p.62 para 1-3 
 
Prior to contacting a person to be questioned in connection with an investigation the  prosecutor collects 
as much information as possible on the level of risk involved for that person as well as for others who 
26 Prosecutor v. Lubanga Decision on Intermediaries ICC-01/04-01/06 31 May 2010 para 30 
27 Ibid paras 40 and 42 
28  Prosecutor v  Lubanga Decision on Intermediaries ICC-01/04-01/06 31 May 2010 paras 2- 3 
29 Ibid para 88 
30  Prosecutor v. Katanga et al, Transcript ICC-01/04-01/07-T-81-Red-ENG WT 25-11-2009 NB T. p. 10 para 20-24 
31 Regulations of the Office of the Prosecutor ICC-BD/05-01-09  23th April 2009, Regulation 36(1) (hereafter OTP 
Regulation) 
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may be at risk on account of such questioning, including those who facilitated contact between the Office 
and the person to be questioned. Based upon its determination of the level of risk, the Office may consider 
alternatives to questioning as well as the possibility of additional security measures, in consultation with 
the Victims and Witnesses Unit as appropriate.32
The Pre‐Interview Measures usually consist of: 
  
• screening, selection of witnesses;   
• security assessment;   
• background preparation (e.g., geographic and community layout) to contextualize witness 
statements and screen witnesses;  
• psychological assessment of victim‐witnesses with special measures for victim‐witnesses who 
were sexually assaulted and for child‐witnesses to ensure that interviewee is in state of 
preparedness so as not to be traumatized by the interview process; and  
• providing witnesses with choice as to gender and age of interviewer. 
All this administrative caution is geared towards the evidence-delivery role of the witness.  As such, 
outside considerations of safety and stability, the OTP is not essentially concerned, as lawyers would not 
be, with extraneous but sometimes vital personal motivations which may lead to witness confusion and 
hostility resulting from their expected trial function.  In particular, the OTP is aware of the dangers in 
relying on witness sourcing and selection through agency and yet with its extremely limited resources and 
investigatory capacity, the OTP cannot dig too deep into the layers of motivation if its case is to run at 
all.33
How does sourcing suggest witness interests – in conflict with prosecution and NGO interests? 
 
The OTP asserts that the process of witnessing is usually a voluntary process, with the witness having an 
option to conclude questioning at anytime.34 Yet if even domestic prosecutorial experience is anything to 
go by, such an atmosphere of witness empowerment is not realistic.  In the international criminal justice 
setting witnesses are disoriented from custom, culture and language. As much research on culturally 
sensitive investigation and prosecution reveals, where witnesses have an ambiguous or fearful approach to 
authority, there may be no genuine understanding of witness independence despite the assurance of this 
by the most scrupulous prosecutors.35
As indicated above, the OTP not in a position to guarantee that witnesses did not come to the court with 
interests beyond truth-telling.  In fact, there is evidence that intermediaries either compensate or promise 
compensation for witness involvement.  The pre-trial chamber in Lubanga, when determining standing in 
the appeal against disclosure, granted independent witness representation because the court recognized a 
possible and real divergence between their interests and that of the OTP. 
 
                                                          
32 OTP Regulation 36(2) 
33 On this point it is worth comparing the investigation budget and resourcing of the permanent ICC, and the ad hoc 
Hariri Tribunal. 
34 OTP Regulation 40(d) 
35 See for a discussion of vulnerable indigenous witnesses and their problems with authority - "Aboriginal Witnesses 
in Queensland's Criminal Courts - Digest" [1996] AUIndigLawRpr 76; (1996) 1(4) Australian Indigenous Law 
Reporter 
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The first witnesses in Lubanga demonstrated confusion over their role, to a point of reversal of testimony.  
This could be explained in part by the trauma of confronting the accused.  More than this it might suggest 
a fundamental confusion in their role and its responsibilities. 
Do witnesses tell the Truth? 
There is little doubt from the experience of the international criminal tribunals that witnesses are not 
always truthful.  The rarity of contempt proceedings does not equate with the less than occasional 
identification of perjured testimony. 
But there is truth and truth.  Many witnesses believe that what they testify is what the court wants to hear, 
what the accused might thank them for or what is consistent with expectations for the court outcome 
which is not in their eyes dependent on objective fact, however that might be viewed. 
The voices of witnesses on their intention and purposes are instructive here in understanding the complex 
contextualization of witness testimony against a variety of competing aims and objectives. Reflect on 
these trial exchanges: 
Prosecution Witness 15: ‘... I came here to denounce certain things …I met the OTP's 
intermediary who told me the following. He said. You have to change your name; you have to 
change your identity. Don't give the true story that took place; in other words, there was a story 
that they were telling to the witnesses. And I say that they're crooks. Why is it that I say that 
they're crooks and swindlers? Well, instead of letting me tell the true story of what took place and 
instead of letting me describe all of the events that I lived through, they are inventing statements 
in order to manipulate the investigation… they're doing that to get rich’…The statements that I 
made before did not come of my own free will. They are statements from another person. I was 
taught these statements for three-and-a-half years. I don't like this. I would like to tell my version 
as I swore I would before everyone."  
Presiding Judge:"This morning you told the Court that you had gone home after school and 
some soldiers from the UPC abducted you, you and your friends. This story that you have told us, 
is it [true] or false?"  
The witness answered, "It is false."36
Such false testimony was wholesale. In Lubanga witness testimony has been recurrently inaccurate.  It 
has even been alleged that most witnesses came in with intention of providing false testimony.
  
37
                                                          
36 Note that shortly after these statements were made his evidence was adjourned so that fresh statement could be 
taken. Lubanga Decision on Intermediaries 31 May 2010 paras 21-22; 25; see also Defence witness 16 testimony 
Aegis Lubanga Chronicle # 88 OTP Representative testifies on the alleged corruption of evidence 18 June 2010 
available at 
  There 
http://www.aegistrust.org/Lubanga-Chronicles/lubanga-chronicle-88-otp-representative-testifies-on-the-
alleged-corruption-of-evidence.html (last visited July 2010) 
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have been accusations of "intermediaries" inducing witnesses to supply false statements to ICC 
investigators which do not reflect the truth of what happened.38 From the outset of the case, there has 
been an issue as to whether some or all of the alleged child soldiers have told the truth about their 
identities and their histories.39
Judges heard evidence concerning allegations that the prosecution knowingly employed or made use of 
intermediaries who influenced individuals to give false testimony thereby abusing its powers,
   
40  or 
persuaded or invited witnesses to give false testimony to the Court. 41 For instance, prosecution witness 15 
testified that there were a number of intermediaries who were in touch with witnesses, and that the 
intermediaries knew each other and collaborated.42 The judges have indicated that what had once been 
unsubstantiated allegations about the behaviour of the intermediaries was now supported by evidence, 
although the judges had not formed any conclusions on that evidence.43
How can Judges in these circumstances ensure the integrity of court proceedings essential for judicial 
decision-making, and the independence and legitimacy of the Court? The Chamber has ruled that there is 
now a real basis for concern as to the system employed by the prosecution for identifying potential 
witnesses. Additionally the Chamber considered that in these circumstances the defence should be 
provided with the opportunity to explore whether the intermediary in question may have attempted to 
  
                                                                                                                                                                                           
37 See Lubanga Transcripts 08/02/2010 http://www.icc-cpi.int/NR/exeres/05B30F9E-82FC-4B77-8BF8-
D623B1C7FFF6.htm, (last visited March 2010);  AEGIS, Lubanga Chronicle 58: Defence Witness 04: "Child 
soldiers were enlisted in the UPC but it wasn´t Thomas Lubanga who recruited them." 10 February 2010- available 
at http://www.aegistrust.org/Lubanga-Chronicles/lubanga-chronicle-58-defence-witness-04-child-soldiers-were-
enlisted-in-the-upc-but-it-wasnat-thomas-lubanga-who-recruited-them.html (last visited March 2010); see also 
Lubanga Chronicle 69-Prosecution intermediaries in the eye of the storm 17 March 2010 available at  
http://www.aegistrust.org/Lubanga-Chronicles/lubanga-chronicle-69-prosecution-intermediaries-in-the-eye-of-the-
storm.html  or generally http://www.aegistrust.org/Lubanga-Trial/ (last visited March 2010); Times online, Chaos 
reigns at International Criminal Court trial of Thomas Lubanga January 29, 2009 
http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/world/africa/article5606892.ece (last visited March 2010); 
reparation Centre for Victims of War Crimes, Lubanga Defense Described as “Witnesses Lied, Lubanga Not 
Guilty”, available at http://warcrimesreparations.info/blog/2010/02/13/lubanga-defense-described-as-witnesses-lied-
lubanga-not-guilty/ (last visited March 2010); Racheal Irwin, Witness admits to false Statements, June 19 2009 
available at http://www.lubangatrial.org/2009/06/19/witness-admits-to-false-statements/ (last visited March 2010) 
38 see Defence allegations Prosecutor v. Lubanga Decision on Intermediaries ICC-01/04-01/06 31 May 2010 paras 
25, 27;  Prosecutor v.  Lubanga, Decision on the prosecution's "Request on the Manner of Questioning of Witness 
DRC-OPT-WWWW-0015" and contact by the prosecution with Court witnesses,  ICC-01/04-01/06, 1 February 
2010, see for paras 3, 11, 17; see also    Racheal Irwin, Witness admits to false Statements, June 19 2009 available at 
http://www.lubangatrial.org/2009/06/19/witness-admits-to-false-statements/ (last visited March 2010); Defense 
Witnesses Claim ICC Agents Concocted Evidence available at http://allafrica.com/stories/201002150005.html (last 
visited March 2010) prosecutor’s allegations against defence  Aegis Lubanga Chronicle #89 OTP Intermediary 321 
to respond to allegations of falsifying evidence  28 June 2010 available at http://www.aegistrust.org/Lubanga-
Chronicles/lubanga-chronicle-89-otp-intermediary-321-to-respond-to-allegations-of-falsifying-evidence.html (last 
visited July 2010) 
39 Prosecutor v. Lubanga Decision on the press interview with Ms Le Fraper du Hellen ICC-01/04-01/06, 12 May 
2010 para 42;  
40 Prosecutor v. Lubanga Decision on the Prosecution's Urgent Request for Variation of the Time- Limit to Disclose 
the Identity of Intermediary 143 or Alternatively to Stay Proceedings Pending Further Consultations with the VWU 
ICC-01/04-01/06 8 July 2010 para 20 
41 Lubanga Decision on Intermediaries para 140; see also paras 16, 27,36,39 
42 Ibid 
43 Lubanga Decision on Intermediaries para 37 
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persuade one or more individuals to give false evidence.44
What advantages are offered witnesses for testifying before the court? Are they 
compensated?   
  Therefore, the court has accepted that this is 
now an institutional, cultural and endemic challenge to the veracity of witness testimony. 
Intermediaries are offering inducements beyond catharsis to encourage and secure witness testimony as 
the following witness allegations demonstrate: 
The witness heard that intermediary 321 had said that there was an NGO which was going to help 
the children who had dropped out of school; they were going to be given apprenticeships, taught 
trades or helped to attend school.45... The witness said of intermediary 321 when he arrived at the 
family, he explained to everyone. He talked about money. He told them that they would be given 
money. He said that the child had to claim to have served as a child soldier in order to get money. 
He went all over the town recruiting children, and he would tell you what you had to say. He told 
the children to claim that they had served as child soldiers, but I knew that the child had never 
been a child soldier.46... Intermediary promised the witness money or give them money and a 
house, and said that the ICC would be there to help him. The witness said that he lied to the 
investigators because 'he merely wanted to have some money. 47
Qualification about similar practice is revealed in the cross-examination of an ICC investigator in 
Katanga et al  
  
 Q. Do you think is there any advantage sometimes or incentive to someone being a witness? 
 A. Yes, of course. I can -- I can easily see how individuals in the operational areas could think 
that it might be beneficial to be a witness. This is, however, something that we clarify to a very 
big detail with the witnesses before engaging in any significant interviewing, or any investigative 
activity. 48
 Q. By way of example, one of the witnesses that we're going to deal with this session, I see has 
had at least the amount of $10,000 spent on that witness? ….Do you concede that these sums 
could, could be a significant incentive, particularly in the context of the DRC, for a witness to 
come forward and appear, as it were, in the best possible light to you as an investigator?
 
49
 A. What I want to make very clear is that the sums that have been made available to you are 
sums that the witnesses have necessarily have not necessarily ever even seen. They are sums 
which the OTP has accrued in terms of, for example, witness accommodation or transportation. 
They are not lump sums given to witnesses. 
 
50
                                                          
44 Ibid  paras. 139, 143, 147 
 
45 Lubanga Decision on Intermediaries para 26 
46 Ibid para 28 
47 Ibid paras 35, 38-39 
48 Prosecutor v. Katanga et al, Transcript. ICC-01/04-01/07-T-81-Red-ENG WT 25-11-2009 NB T. p. 62 paras 4-9 
49 Ibid p.62 paras 10-11 and p.63 paras 3-5 
50 Ibid p.63 paras 6-9 
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Even so, financial payment51
A field liaison coordinator for the Office of the Prosecutor (OTP) who the judges ordered to testify on the 
alleged corruption of evidence in Lubanga responded to the allegations that witnesses and intermediaries 
could have received money in exchange for their cooperation with the Court. According to the officer all 
payments were approved by his supervisors, they were duly signed for and the receipts were submitted to 
the ICC headquarters. 
 for witness testimony is not refuted. 
52
are paid in accordance with the various tasks that they carry out. There is a sheet that is prepared 
by the investigators at headquarters. They are the ones who keep track of the tasks in the field and 
prepare a document showing the number of days of work that intermediaries did in the field, and 
that is the basis on which payment is made." 
 This does not explain what in fact the payments were for beyond what were 
determined as costs involved in transporting the intermediaries as well as for their subsistence and 
communication costs. He stated that at times the house rent for the intermediaries was paid after they 
were relocated on account on security concerns. He also explained that the intermediaries who work for 
the OTP: 
53
Importantly, child soldiers who testified for the Prosecution, it is asserted by the OTP, were never 
promised or given any incentives to provide incriminating evidence. From the OTP perspective the 
children and their guardians volunteered to cooperate with the prosecutors. Assurances from 
intermediaries, such as this, endorsed that opinion:"My job was to take children to meet the investigators 
and I limited myself to [this]...So no promises were made to the parents or the children.’’
 
54
This said, the OTP cannot confirm or challenge what the intermediaries promised prospective witnesses.  
This inability to monitor agency is particularly vulnerable bearing in mind that the intermediaries were no 
doubt being resourced by the OTP on the basis of ‘results’. 
 
What might induce witnesses to lie?  
As clearly seen above child witnesses have been influenced by intermediaries to provide false testimony.  
One reason a witness may lie is in order to gain an advantage, knowingly that by providing whatever 
testimony whether true or false they will receive money or prestige or some other pecuniary benefit. As 
the OTP expresses in its responses above it is problematic to balance the demands of witnesses without 
appearing to “bribe” them, particularly when relying on dependent and largely ungoverned field agency.  
What is the motive of a witness to testify beyond wanting to tell the truth? What is morality to an 
impoverished coming to the Hague from war-ravaged regions in Africa, without subsistence futures and 
exposed to the savage destruction of families and communities? What is morality to a child soldier, 
starving but for the prospect of real money dependent on delivering the story they have been told that the 
court wants to hear?  
                                                          
51 Pursuant to OTP Regulation 43(1) no inducement whatsoever shall be offered to a person in exchange for 
questioning or a statement. However, persons are compensated for expenses incurred and earnings lost as a result of 
their cooperation, for the duration of such questioning or provision of a statement.(OTP Regulation 43(2). 
52 Aegis Lubanga Chronicle #88 OTP Representative testifies on the alleged corruption of evidence 18 June 2010 
available at http://www.aegistrust.org/Lubanga-Chronicles/lubanga-chronicle-88-otp-representative-testifies-on-the-
alleged-corruption-of-evidence.html (last visited July 2010) 
53 Ibid 
54 Ibid 
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Even though it could be said that witnesses represent one cosmopolitan society of victims, in reality they 
come from different communities, from different ethnic groups either targeted during the crime or 
accused of perpetration, or from a separate nation not directly affected by the crime.  
Some victim witnesses may think they have an individually determined morally justifiable reason for 
lying or giving false testimony, for instance a rape victim testifying against an accused who was not 
necessarily at the scene of rape but who assets she was since she cannot find or remember the real 
perpetrator.  And a victim witness who had all family members killed by militia but decides to provide 
testimony against one soldier due to vengeance against the rebels as a whole. Such testimonies may be 
given in the hope for pay-back, or in the belief that no lie could be proportionate to the crime committed.  
Obviously defence witnesses have partial reasons for lying during testimony to acquit accused. For most 
witnesses the requirement of justice exceeds the requirement for truth.  Yet is the oath to tell the truth 
imbued with obligations that are perhaps harder to escape than one might assume against self interest? 55
Then there is the recognition that conflict is not conducive to ‘black and white’ truth for those emerging 
from the struggle. Involvement in conflict confuses the dynamics of victim and perpetrator. Resentment 
may cloud testimony or reduces its clarity. The enduring commitment to one side of the struggle does not 
evaporate in the witness box.
 
56
Even the conflicts of adversarial witness testing, said to test truth through the fire of examination, often 
conceal powerful passions and self-transcending behavioural motives of witnesses who are ready to lie as 
a consequence of the court-room contest that can be seen by them as a culturally remote distraction from 
the real struggle which is ongoing in their experience, and which the trial will not resolve. It is difficult, 
but not impossible to predict and to determine the specific factors which may motivate each individual 
witness to lie under oath. Damaska assumes the intuitively possible position that while the better angels of 
our nature have only a tenuous control over our behaviour, while evil cannot be educated out of the 
human heart. Humans respond to both self interest and moral values.
  
57
The dysfunctional, survivalist and deeply obligatory social setting of the victim at home is another 
ingredient in understanding the distortion of truthful testimony. In the Congo, for instance, the role of 
children in society is to help their parents and community elders.
 Self interest could be the only 
spirit to move a particular witness to lie under oath and could therefore be a primary motivation for giving 
testimony and for committing perjury. What fosters and stimulates that interest are sound questions for 
the practical prosecutor or judge concerned for the morality of judicial decision-making and the 
legitimacy of the court. 
58
                                                          
55 Frank Terrier ‘The Procedure before the Trial Chamber’ in A. Cassese, P.Gaeta and J.R.W.D Jones,  The Rome 
Statute of the International Criminal Court: A Commentary, (Vol II. Oxford University Press, 2002) pp 1277-1318 
at p.1301. 
 This is why it is very easy for 
intermediaries to induce children to provide false testimony for a perceived wider community benefit. 
Historically lawyers and indeed psychologists have viewed children as rather unreliable witnesses. They 
have been presented as prone to fantasy and the making of false allegations and are inherently suggestible 
by authority figures. How much more do in the formal situation, so foreign to the witness daily 
experience, of post-colonial cultural clash? Of course, adult witnesses can be equally unreliable and prone 
to error but children have come to be seen as particularly problematic. Children’s reliability can 
compromise accuracy, increase the dangers of advocates’ suggestibility, impugning consistency and 
56 Ibid.  
57 Damaska 2008 Chicago-Kent law review p.334 (check this) 
58 See, ‘Redress, Victims, Perpetrators or Heroes? Child Soldiers before the International Criminal Cour’t September 
2006 p.7 
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honesty.59  Many children, may decide to give evidence with the tacit consent of elders and parents, or are 
driven to testify as a result of abject poverty, as a means of putting food on their family’s table. The 
average income in the affected regions is less than $1 per day.60
All this is exacerbated by the desperate inadequacy and separability of the ICC witness compensation 
scheme. For victim witnesses, Article 75 provides limited reparation, and it states that “the Court shall 
establish principles relating to reparations to, or in respect of, victims including restitution, compensation 
and rehabilitation”.
  Small wonder testimony is sold as the 
spoils of war. 
61
What of ‘expenses’ for a witness who has little concept of this commercial arrangement or of its 
distinction from bribes or inappropriate financial inducements? From the moment a person joins the ICC 
witness protection programme, the issue of self-sufficiency is a concern. The VWU must provide the 
potential with the necessary support to enable him or her to achieve the goal of providing testimony.
 The extent to which accessing this fund is an extant influence on witness testimony, 
or its limitations encourage other less legitimate forms of compensation also needs consideration when 
understandings why victim witnesses lie. 
62
The question indeed arises as to what incentive there is for a witness to come and testify at the ICC, 
besides her desire to assist in the administration of justice. Failing any subpoena-threat, it now appears 
more than likely that right from the sourcing of witnesses by intermediaries, witnesses try to get the best 
bargain on their testimony, and regard their testimony as a quid pro quo, which may coincidentally 
jeopardize that testimony's credibility.
 
Would witnesses consider this as payoff’s from the ICC? Sluiter has suggested that there is an increasing 
risk that a witness prospective testimony is used as a bargaining chip in obtaining a variety of benefits, 
such as financial compensation or (far-reaching) protective measures.  
63
What is the court’s confidence in the truthfulness of witness testimony?  
  
At the outset, the conflict of interest theme has at least two directions.  We have so far indicated 
the motivations which play on a witness to tell anything but the truth.  It appears that to whatever 
extent the prosecutors and judges have more than suggestions of these complications.  If so, one 
would assume that the expressed importance of protecting truthful testimony would necessitate 
swift and forceful legal action against perjury.  Without this consequence the deterrent possibility 
of protective measures such as contempt would be minimized.  However, here is where another 
conflict of interest seems to be emerging for the court.  The OTP is currently inextricably 
dependent on intermediaries for sourcing witnesses.  What is clear about this practice is that: 
                                                          
59 Graham Davies and Helen Westcott Investigative Interviewing with Children: progress and Pitfalls in Anthony 
Heaton-Armstrong ed. Witness testimony, psychological, investigative and evidential perspectives (Oxford 
University press 2006) p.155 
60  See ‘Redress, Victims, Perpetrators or Heroes? Child Soldiers before the International Criminal Court’ September 
2006 p.7 
61 See Rule 94; see also the UN Guidelines on Justice in Matters involving Child Victims and Witnesses stipulate that 
‘child victims should, wherever possible, receive reparations in order to achieve full redress, reintegration and 
recovery; Sergey Vasiliev, Artilce 63(3) and personal interests of victims in the emerging practice of the ICC in 
Carsten Stahn and Goran Sluiter (eds) The Emerging Practice of the International Criminal Court (Martinus Nijhoff 
publishers 2009) pp634-690 at p.637 
62 ICC: Summary Report on the Round Table on the Protection of Victims and Witnesses Appearing Before the 
International Criminal Court available at http://www.icc-cpi.int/Menus/ICC/Structure+of+the+Court/Protection/ 
(last visited July 2010)  P.7 
63 Goran Sluiter, ‘I beg you, please come testify’- 2009, NCRIMLAR 590 p.606 
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• some intermediaries are offering inappropriate inducements to witnesses for their 
testimony; 
• as a result some witnesses are lying under oath in an effort to realize those inappropriate 
inducements; and 
• some investigators and prosecutors at the very least are advancing oral testimony which 
cn be tainted by personal interst. 
An example is as follows. According to the court liaison officer, intermediary Mr. X never told 
him that he thought or knew that one of the children was lying about having been a child soldier.  
If he had told me of such a thing, I would have reacted immediately. I would have 
informed my bosses that such a child who was sent to me, who was questioned, was a not 
a child soldier, or had lied.64
The witness also denied that Mr. X knew the questions that the investigator posed to the children he 
interviewed.  
 
Mr. X never saw the questionnaire. It was not intended for him and I did not discuss it with him. 
The questions were for me; I met the children and I questioned them. 
He added that after questioning the children, he never discussed with Mr. X what the children had said.65
Despite the denials, this may in practice be only part of the story. The starting point here should question 
how does the prosecutor select the intermediaries which provide testimony and how do they ensure that 
these intermediaries don’t influence the testimony of these witnesses?
  
66 As the investigators are based in 
The Hague, all investigation missions are planned in advance, including all foreseeable contacts with 
intermediaries and potential contact with children.  The Gender and Children Unit may travel to the 
situation country in order to identify possible intermediaries, and modes of operating67 Even so, how does 
the OTP assess the objectivity and credibility of intermediaries that are used to conduct investigations?  
Investigators in endeavouring to evaluate the reliability of intermediaries that they use, search out other 
available local sources to corroborate what that intermediary might represent. Such information can be 
sometimes very limited. When first meeting an intermediary, the investigators do not immediately task 
them to source witnesses.68 In this first meeting the investigators say they explore the intermediary’s 
motives and background. Next, before doing a proper tasking of the intermediary, the investigator may 
ask the intermediary to do something quite simple which is not related to witnesses. In this way some 
basic testing is employed before investigators engage intermediaries in any activity that deals especially 
with witnesses.69
                                                          
64 Aegis Lubanga Chronicle #88 OTP Representative testifies on the alleged corruption of evidence 18 June 2010 
available at 
 It appears, however, that these checks and tests are more designed with an operational 
rather than motivational purpose in mind. 
http://www.aegistrust.org/Lubanga-Chronicles/lubanga-chronicle-88-otp-representative-testifies-on-the-
alleged-corruption-of-evidence.html (last visited July 2010) 
65 Ibid 
66 Lubanga Decision on Intermediaries 31 May 2010 paras 136 and 146 
67 Redress, Victims, Perpetrators or Heroes? Child Soldiers before the International Criminal Court September 2006 
pp.35-36 
68  Prosecutor v. Katanga et al, Transcript ICC-01/04-01/07-T-81-Red-ENG WT 25-11-2009 NB T. p.37 para 9-22 
69 Ibid p.37 paras 23-25 and p.38 paras1-4 
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The limitations faced by investigators in the field in terms of geographic, experiential and cultural 
distance from the people and the limited amount of public archives or records available to them makes 
common material witness proofing almost impossible.70
When a witness decides to testify there is a process of witness familiarisation to introduce the witness 
generally to the Court’s infrastructure and procedures, one of which ensures that the witness clearly 
understands that he or she is under a strict legal obligation to tell the truth when testifying.
  
71  Moreover, 
the parties to proceedings are under strict rules in the preparation of witnesses to avoid coaching their 
testimony.72 The practice of witness proofing which is well established at the ad hoc tribunals73 has been 
prohibited before the ICC.74
The OTP says that the interview of every witness should be in a manner that maximizes spontaneous 
disclosure, and enables the investigator to secure a comprehensive grasp of detail essential to the creation 
of a full statement, faithful to the witness’s account.
  
75
But the veracity of witness testimony is not simply or singly the responsibility of prosecutors. How can 
ICC judges determine whether child soldiers for instance are credible? Graham Davies and Helen 
Westcott observe that just like any evidence the statement of a child needs to be weighed by the judge 
against the statements of the other parties involved, together with any forensic evidence that may be 
available.
   
76
The relationship between deception its detection and witness credibility is complex. In particular, where 
the court wants to believe in the veracity of the child witness, and the capacity of the defence to challenge 
their evidence is limited then detection is more unlikely. Introverted and socially anxious children are less 
likely to be believed irrespective of whether they are telling the truth or lies. Implications of this for 
  Children require more advanced cognitive understanding and language skills in order to 
maintain elaborate deliberate verbal deception; for example an appreciation of what another person is 
thinking in order to mislead them. In addition, children may not find the line between truth and falsehood 
clear when other cultural and contextual imperatives predominate. This is particularly so in competing 
environments of authority and cultural dislocation such as the courtroom setting.  
                                                          
70 Ibid p.38 paras 5-8 
71 Prosecutor v.  Lubanga decision regarding the practices used to prepare and familiarise witnesses for giving 
testimony at trial, ICC-01/04-01/06-1049 30 November 2007 para 29-30; see also Kai Ambos, ‘Witness Proofing’ 
before the ICC: Neither legally admissible nor necessary in Carsten Stahn and Goran Sluiter (eds) The Emerging 
Practice of the International Criminal Court (Martinus Nijhoff publishers 2009) pp. 599-614 at 599 ; 
72 Prosecutor v. Lubanga Decision regarding the protocol on the practices to be used to prepare witnesses for trial 
(ICC-01/04-01/06) 23 May 2008; lubanga(ICC-01/04-01/06)  Transcript 16 January 2009 pp24-29) 
73 see Haradinaj Decision on defence Request for Audio Recording of Prosecution Witness Proofing Sessions 23 
May 2007) 
74 Lubanga (ICC-01/04-01/06) Decision on the practices of witnesses familiarization and witness proofing 8 
November  2006; Lubanga (ICC-01/04-01/06) Decision Regarding the practices used to prepare  and farmiliarize 
witnesses for giving testimony at trial 30 November 2007; Katanga et al (ICC-01/04-01/07)  Decision on a number 
of procedural issues raised by the registry 14 May 2009 para 18; Sergey Vsilev, Proofing the Ban on witness 
Proofing’ Did the ICC Get it Right (2009) 20 CLF 193) ; Schabas 2010, p.  842; Kai Ambos, ‘Witness Proofing’ 
before the ICC: Neither legally admissible nor necessary in Carsten Stahn and Goran Sluiter (eds) The Emerging 
Practice of the International Criminal Court (Martinus Nijhoff publishers 2009) pp. 599-614 
75 See Eric Shepherd and Rebecca Milne ‘Have you told management about this?’ Bringing witness interviewing 
into the twenty-first century  in Anthony Heaton-amstrong ed. Witness testimony, psychological, investigative and 
evidential perspectives oxford university press 2006 p.142  
76 Graham Davies and Helen Westcott Investigative Interviewing with Children: progress and Pitfalls in Anthony 
Heaton-Armstrong ed. Witness testimony, psychological, investigative and evidential perspectives Oxford 
University press 2006 p.167 
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interviewing socially and culturally dislocated child witnesses include the use of open questions as far as 
possible to promote reliance on the child’s original memory and deter one word answers (which make it 
easier to maintain any dishonesty). 77 Similarly scripted passages (‘verbal formulae’) are included, to 
cover raising issues of concern, and exploring a child’s understanding of truth and falsehood. Legal 
advocates, judges and fact-finders need to be informed about these factors and others concerning the 
reliability of children’s evidence generally when a child is questioned during a case and decisions are 
made concerning the accuracy and reliability of the child’s evidence.78
Nature of truth-finding through witness testimony – adversarial truth? 
  
The bedrock of ICC judicial decision-making and verdict outcomes is the honesty of witnesses in trial.  
How much this is an actual as well as an ideological concern for the judiciary critically depends on 
testimony veracity, the challenges to it and the manner in which the court either protects against or 
tolerates divergence from truth (or subjective story-telling).   
Witness testimony is meant to be founded on truth and should represent the truth. The ICC prosecutor for 
instance has the duty under Article 54(a) of the Rome Statute to establish the truth while Article 69(3) 
gives the Judges the authority to request the submission of all evidence that it considers necessary for the 
determination of truth.79
The use of the adversarial model by the Court requires that all evidence be scrutinized orally through 
examination and cross-examination which is necessary for the determination of truth. According to 
Article 54(3) (b), during the investigative and prosecution stage, the Court through its various Organs 
may request the presence of and question persons being witnesses.  
 Court officials are bound to establish the truth and they do this through the use of 
witnesses to provide evidence.  
Testamentary evidence can be adduced to establish the factual truth80; as with domestic court procedure 
oral testimony consists of witnesses personally appearing in Court and in general swearing to the truth of 
what they depose.81 Witness evidence makes clear or ascertains the truth of the fact or point in issue; it 
contributes to the contested explanation and predominance of any question in contest before the ICC. 
According to Claus Kress the witness is widely if not generally considered to be the most important 
instrument to ascertain the truth in criminal proceedings, stating ‘witnesses are the eyes and ears of 
justice’82
While witness testimony should be founded on truth, nonetheless this is not always the case. ‘Truth 
telling’ rather than truthful testimony is all too often in the international criminal trial confounded or 
confused by contested interests. A conflicting self interest compromising the objective certainty and 
eventual proof of testimonial evidence is the struggle for a considerable number of witnesses, especially 
those who have been the victims of the most serious crimes. Undeniably, victims have an interest in 
  
                                                          
77  Ibid p. 157 
78 Ibid p. 127 
79 See Robert Heinch How to achieve fair and expeditious trial proceedings before the ICC: Is it time for more 
judge-dominated approach in Carsten Stahn and Goran Sluiter (eds) The Emerging Practice of the International 
Criminal Court (Martinus Nijhoff publishers 2009) pp.479-499 at pp486-487 
80 We use this notion as a term of evidentiary art which can be distinguished from truth in a moral or philosophical 
form. 
81 See J.E Penner, Mozley &Whiteley’s Law Dictionary 12th edition (Butterworths 2001) p. 133 
82 Claus Kress, ‘Witnesses in Proceedings Before the International Criminal Court’, in Horst Fischer, Claus Kress & 
Sascha Rolf Luder (eds), International and National Prosecution of Crimes under International Law ;Current 
Developments (Berlin Verlag Arno Spitz GMBH 2001) pp. 309-383 at p. 309 
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criminal trials as a form of redress and may also have a strong desire to be heard which may be in and of 
itself, sufficient to obtain the witnesses’ attendance.83
And what is the witness perspective on oral testimony within international criminal trials? Is witness 
testimony as ‘truth telling’ from witness perspective the same as presenting tested truth from the 
perspective of the legal professional?  We will suggest not.  We assert that an interrogation of how 
witnesses come to give oral testimony in an international criminal trial will indicate what are the 
differences between truth telling and truth, and what the courts can do with this realization in protecting 
and valuing oral testimony or otherwise. Recourse to the adversarial fact-finding procedures in the trial 
may not outweigh the potent influences on truth telling, and may actually conceal the reality of oral 
testimony.   
 Self interest may at the same time be a strong 
rationale for a one-eyed, or partial presentation of testimony, and this is confirmed by the inducements 
offered witnesses to give testimony. We will show later in this analysis that against the legislative 
assumption that witness testimony is meant to be founded on truth and to represent truth the individual 
and collective interests that drive witnesses attendance to give testimony are both obvious and known to 
compromise truth, and thereby the force of oral testimony to confirm the moral court. 
The problem for the witness is to know what is expected by the court against achieving their induced 
interests.  The problem for the court is confirming truthful testimony, beyond adversarial form, knowing 
the likelihood of influence-based truth telling.  And the problem for the legitimacy of the court is in 
unmasking the shaky nexus between oral testimony and morality.  Finally, using the legal mechanism of 
contempt as a conventional protection of trial truth, what is indicated in the evaluation of the moral court 
by the place of contempt proceedings in protecting the veracity of oral testimony and the legitimacy of 
judicial decision-making? 
One of the principal interests that motivate victim testimony is putting the record right. As the experience 
of the truth and reconciliation commissions demonstrate, this too is a contested desire.  Personal histories 
are deeply subjective and the ‘truths’ they reveal are often contrary.  Some critics of the wider goals of the 
ICC argue, therefore, that to entertain this aim is to undermine the moral certainty of adversarial fact 
finding.  Perhaps the bridge between the two positions is not to confuse fact with truth.  On this point 
more will be said later. 
Push to put history right  
In the mind of victim witnesses in particular, if their story is not told or it is compromised then the court 
has the obligation (moral and factual) to put it right. The court on the other hand usually is not interested 
in story telling beyond fact finding. Indeed the adversarial process is as much designed to constrain as to 
unfold competing stories.  So where is the truth in putting the record straight and how can the threat of 
contempt for untruth better ensure the right story to emerge?  
Witnesses play a significant role in assisting the courts to produce a reliable historical record of the 
context of international crime. Witnesses’ voices through story telling should enable Judges to get a richer 
understanding of the events on which they are required to pass judgment.  The reality of victim’s 
suffering may be beyond their horizons of judicial experience and as such needs personification and 
contextual location through a more free-flowing testimony. 84
                                                          
83 See Goran Sluiter, ‘Th e ICTR and the protection of witnesses’, (2005) Journal of International Criminal Justice, 
pp. 962–976 at pp.964 
  
84 See Mirjan Damaska, What is the point of International Criminal Justice? 2008 Chicago-Kent Law Review, Vol 
83:1, 329 at 334 
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Similarly, the use of expert witnesses to provide testimony is used to give the judges an understanding of 
the historical events in the area where crimes were committed. In Lubanga the judges elected to instruct 
an expert witness who was a UN Special Rapporteur85  according to Regulation 44(4) of the Regulations 
of the Court.86
It is important that we are assisted by more than one expert …because it is crucial that we 
have a thorough understanding of the general circumstances historical and otherwise in these 
general events occurred.
 Although the parties had already made clear their intention to call at least one witness to 
deal with the background and context of the conflict, the Chamber said:  
87
But story-telling and historical recording may not sit well with the evidentiary limitations at work in 
testing criminal liability.  The court through oral testimony, therefore, has to balance the story against the 
need to test evidentiary fact.  The victims’ desire for criminal prosecution of the perpetrator has been 
confirmed by empirical studies;
  
88  Victims desire criminal prosecution to achieve accountability, 
retribution and equal treatment.89
Reconciliation 
 The story-telling of truth and reconciliation institutions and processes 
may only go part way to achieving these purposes and is not compatible with retributive aspirations, 
because story-telling may not satisfy the standards of factual evidence. 
According to Gallimore, testimony during trial process assists with reconciliation because it has the effect 
of giving voice to victims and survivors, allowing them to tell their stories and to validate their experience 
of suffering.90 He observes that testifying often has a cathartic effect that allows victims to release their 
hurt and to more easily embrace forgiveness and reconciliation with those who have harmed them. 
Through the recording of testimony given by witnesses and defendants in the trial process, the 
International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR), he argues, serves as a documenter of "truth." The 
Tribunal also functions as a guardian of history, particularly judicial history, giving a verified factual 
account of what happened. In many ways, the Tribunal's records provide a truth that would not otherwise 
be told by traditional historians.91
The desire to set the historical record straight and to restore the integrity of human remembrance is 
greatly strengthened by the belief that truth-telling about the past is a necessary precondition for 
reconciliation and avoidance of future conflicts. 
  
92
                                                          
85Prosecutor v. Lubanga ICC-01/04-01/06 Transcript 25 November 2008 pp.17-18; Lubanga Instructions to the 
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  If the truth is not told or it is compromised then the 
court has the obligation moral and factual to put it right.  
86 See Regulations of the Court, Adopted by the judges of the Court on 26 May 2004, 17- 28 May 2004 ICC-BD/01-
01-04 
87 Prosecutor v. Lubanga ICC-01/04-01/06 Transcript 25 November 2008 p.18 
88 See T.K. Kuhner, ‘The Status of Victims in the Enforcement of International Criminal Law’,6 Oregon Review of 
International Law (2004) 95-152 at 135 
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at pp.964 
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But as truth has become associated with the  truth and reconciliation and transitional justice paradigms,93
Restorative justice, celebrated as the preferred outcome of alternative international criminal justice 
paradigms, is concerned to make offenders responsible and victims forgiving.  Both these outcomes 
become more distant intentions when contextualized in the horrendous crime and victimization with 
which International criminal justice is concerned.  To this extent justice for victims and justice for 
offenders may be irreconcilable procedural directions within the international criminal trial.  In 
conventional trials due process, and its endorsement of the rights of the perpetrator, accused and victim 
face each other across the courtroom.  This alone has tended to create pressures on the resultant veracity 
of victim witness testimony.  So, how can procedural protections confirm due process, assist in securing 
rightful convictions, and confirm and support truthful testimony? 
 
which are said to be better suited to the reconciliation and restitution , fact-finding in the adversarial 
context should be (if not needs be) distinguished from truth-telling, and sometimes even from truthful 
testimony.  The oral testimony process in light of adversarial procedure is, at present, not designed to 
complement reconciliation, nor will truth always be its result. 
Procedural protections? 
Earlier in this paper we have suggested that traditional procedural protections from both civil and 
common law traditions may not provide the effective filter on which judicial decision-making may rely 
when weighing witness testimony.  The sections that follow will detail the failure of these protections and 
speculate on the reasons behind compromised testimony in the first place. To introduce this descriptive 
phase it is useful to generally highlight some due process or rights–based paradigms justifying the need 
for oral testimony and which are at risk from procedural protection failure. 
Open justice principle 
Accepted conventions of trial fairness have it that witnesses testifying in open court enable justice to be 
done, and be seen to be done. This assumption rests on at least three conditions.  First, the accused is 
enabled to face his accuser, and challenge the accusations.  Second, the community at large is enabled to 
participate in the exercise of justice through the public display of oral evidence.  Finally, and perhaps 
most easily contested is the requirement that witnesses and the accused (represented as they are by 
uniform professional counsel) stand in a position of equality of arms. 
Confrontation – qualified by anonymity – Tadic instance 
Particularly with child witnesses, it has become common in modern criminal trials to qualify the 
opportunity for witness confrontation through various degrees and mechanisms of limited anonymity.  As 
with the debate in the UK surrounding witness anonymity in serious crime cases, any degree of witness 
anonymity has the capacity to deny true confrontation and lead to injustice for the accused, and a failing 
in the potential for active and informed tested testimony. In the ICTY case of Tadic, there is stark 
evidence of this concern.  In that case the prosecutor introduced an anonymous witness who gave oral 
evidence that the accused had killed members of his family, including his father.  The defence, by other 
means, became aware of the identity of the witness and later produced contradictory evidence that the 
father was indeed still living. 
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Of course no perspective on trial fairness is without tension.  Child witnesses are known to be particularly 
vulnerable to the pressures of court-room confrontation, exposing their evidence to compromise.  As such 
anonymity might offer more than a protection to special classes of witnesses, in that their testimony on 
which the court relies could be validated by removing the pressures of identity exposure or direct 
confrontation. 
Testing testimony – conditional on proper equality of arms 
On the expectation for equality of arms, the international criminal trial is particularly exposed. 
Prosecutors have much more resources when it comes to victim sourcing and proofing. It would appear in 
the first trial before the ICC (from what was revealed in the disclosure hearings) it is the prosecutor who 
has the special relationship with the UN agencies on the ground and with NGO’s when it comes to 
witness production.  
Besides the language, cultural and experiential features which separate the accused from his counsel in 
the Hague, the largely civil law procedural approaches to defence examination and cross examination 
retard challenging the prosecution case.  This is compounded by more generous rules for admitting and 
confirming evidence, and by the largely absent documentary and forensic evidence resources favouring 
the accused.  The conviction rates in the international criminal tribunals, we suggest, are not therefore a 
natural consequence of an effective civil law style pre-trial investigation process.  Of similar influence is 
the unbalancing of defence capacity and impact.94
Judicial Intervention 
 
Beyond critical comment on witness testimony in their summing up, judges have the capacity during 
witness examination and the presentation of oral testimony to test its veracity.  In common law traditions 
such judicial interventionism (more common in civil law traditions) is exhibited cautiously so that no 
favouritism is shown to either case.  In particular, judges will be reluctant to open up their own line of 
investigation for fear that it will overtake a particular line of enquiry or even hi-jack the case being put by 
the prosecution or the defence.  Judicial tact needs to be balanced against the legitimate desire of the 
judge to protect the nature of the evidence being presented for deliberation.  Judges cannot stray into the 
management of the case, or the insinuation of what evidence should be presented before them and what 
should not. 
In international criminal tribunals and the ICC, the judge has more inquisitorial intervention options as 
procedural possibilities. In Lubanga for instance, judges have been vigorous in their efforts to source 
evidence and to test the motivations and practices of investigators and intermediaries who generate 
witness appearance and eventual oral testimony.  The ICC judges  have been very hard on both sides of 
the case,  especially prosecutor, requiring them to provide information on sourcing, to call intermediaries 
and investigators to come testify in court, and to hunt down more information on the factors which might 
compromise truthful testimony. In this sense Judges could be viewed as struggling to maintain the nexus 
between witness evidence, truth and legitimate judicial decision-making, thereby upholding the moral 
standing of the court by not letting these reservations pass by unaddressed.  There have even been 
suggestions of a stay of proceedings until these questions of sourcing and motivation dealt with to the 
satisfaction of the bench. 
Contempt 
                                                          
94 Prosecutors and defenders before the ICTY have confirmed this assertion with the authors. 
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One important focus of this paper is the virility of contempt prosecutions to either punish untruthful 
witnesses or to act as any real deterrent to future perjury.  Even in established and well-functioning 
domestic criminal jurisdictions criminal contempt prosecutions are not common.  There are several 
obvious reasons for this, not the least of which is the judge’s capacity and practice to discount or to deny 
the comparative persuasiveness of suspect witness testimony in judicial summing-up or reasoning.  
Another explanation which is pertinent to the international trial context, and somewhat subliminal, is the 
additional adverse impacts that the threat of contempt may have on witness co-operation (beyond 
deterrence).  Prosecutors are particularly exposed to witness hostility or reluctance and contempt threats 
do not ameliorate the natural apprehensions carried by witnesses, themselves frightened by the truth. 
Having identified in a general sense some important procedural protections, and their problems for 
ensuring truthful testimony we can now move on to interrogating the practice around these themes within 
international criminal trials. 
Justice of witness testimony – accused facing his accuser  
In the international criminal trial how has oral testimony become a significant evidentiary technique for 
judicial determination and not documentary truth? Unlike Nuremberg and Tokyo, were there was detailed 
documentation of atrocities from liberating troops before accused testimony was introduced, these deep 
documentary understandings are not as yet available to the ICC, the ad hoc and hybrid tribunals. With 
Nuremberg, for instance, there was detailed records kept by the German military command and the 
tribunal judges consulted this source as significant evidence on which to determine liability, before and 
outside oral testimony. Present day international criminal tribunals suffer a lack of documentary evidence 
as a natural consequence of the atrocities not being meticulously documented, nor in their nature and 
context could they be. In such situations evidence to sustain allegations will more consistently come from 
the mouth of witnesses.95
Goran Sluiter argues that the essential reliance by judges and lawyers on testimonial evidence can be 
understood with regard to both particular features of international criminal prosecution before these courts, 
and the unique nature of the crimes before them.
 
96 The crimes prosecuted are emblematic of much wider 
victimisation and witnesses speak on behalf of communities and cultures.  The ad hoc tribunals face the 
added complexity of trying subordinates who having perpetrated the alleged crimes themselves, also 
combining with others above and below to achieve the joint criminal enterprise. In such situations, the 
evidence will be concealed by the company of accused, and remains the sole province eyewitnesses and 
victims, not from documents.97
For Kai Ambos the importance of documentary evidence, as can be seen in the major war crimes trials 
from Nuremberg to Arusha, increases with the status of the accused in the chain of command. 
 This is especially where the armies of perpetrators are loosely configured, 
disorderly managed and transitional. 
98
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Tokyo trials and explained that although in the early days of the ad hoc tribunals oral testimony was 
emphasized:  
the more access the Prosecution had to official documents of the entities involved or to audio 
or video evidence the lesser weight was placed on the evidence given by witnesses.99
Moreover, in the balance between oral and documentary evidence, most probative weight is attributed to 
live testimony in the courtroom, where through examination and cross examination the trial judges may 
directly assess the witnesses’ reliability.
  
100
Eyewitness testimony can make a deep impression on the judges.  The Statute and Rules of the ICC have 
assigned the Judges the role of sorting out credibility issues and making judgments about the truth of 
witness statements. The judges have independent fact finding powers under ICC Article 69(3) charging 
the Chamber to act as fact-finder and to determine the truth. The judges are given powers to interrogate 
witnesses thus making it possible for them to establish the truth, outside the questioning of Counsel.  As 
in most contemporary verdict delivery and sentencing practice, the judges of the ICC make 
determinations of witness credibility and veracity in the process of reasoning and justifying their final 
judgement.  
  This obviously depends on equality of arms which is 
notoriously problematic from the defence perspective in international trial proceedings.  
ICC adversarial (common-law) witness proofing which enables factual judicial decision-making 
procedure, necessitates the reliance that is placed on the right to cross-examination and defence challenge. 
Yet examination and cross-examination aside, Judges are the fact-finders, and witness credibility issues 
are left to be determined by them.  
The ICTR employs the adversarial nature of the trial, as well as the accused’s right to examine witnesses 
against him or her through requiring live witness testimony.101  In Katanga et al case it was held Article 
69 of the Rome Statute provides for the principle of free assessment of evidence. It is up to the competent 
Chamber to decide on probative value of any piece of evidence introduced for the purpose of the 
confirmation hearing or the trial.102 The requirement for the witness to present testimony in person tends 
to reflect the desire that the primary source of evidence which is his or her own testimony presented 
before the Court, should be available for testing at the trial in the examination and cross examination of 
the witness. 103  Examination of live testimony also provides the Judges with the opportunity to ask 
questions and evaluate the demeanour and credibility of the witness.104
In Lubanga it was held that depending on the circumstances, there can be material advantages in 
testimony being given in its entirety viva voce before the Court, particularly when evidence of 
significance is challenged or requires comprehensive investigation. The live questioning of a witness in 
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open court on all aspects of his or her evidence can have a material impact on the Chamber's overall 
assessment of the evidence, since it is assumed in the context of open examination the evidence can be 
fully investigated and tested by questioning, and the Court is able to assess its accuracy, reliability and 
honesty, in part by observing the conduct and demeanour of the witness.105
Witness testimony before the ICTR has shaped the definition of certain international crimes. For instance, 
the tribunal held in Prosecutor v. Akayesu
 
106  that in considering the extent to which acts of sexual 
violence constitute crimes against humanity under Article 3(g) of its Statute, the Tribunal must define 
rape, as there is no commonly accepted definition of the term in international law. Many of the witnesses 
used the term "rape" in their testimony, and at times the Prosecution and the Defence also tried to elicit an 
explicit description of what happened in physical terms, to document what the witnesses mean by the 
term "rape". The Tribunal noted that while rape has been historically defined in national jurisdictions as 
non-consensual sexual intercourse, variations on the form of rape may include acts which involve the 
insertion of objects and/or the use of bodily orifices not considered to be intrinsically sexual. An act such 
as that described by a certain Witness KK in her testimony - the Interahamwes thrusting a piece of wood 
into the sexual organs of a woman as she lay dying - constituted rape in the Tribunal's view. 107
Witness testimony, particularly victim witnesses in horrific circumstances such as rape in war, has 
necessitated the rethinking of procedural practice. For instance, prior to Akayesu, rape necessarily 
involved a witness' in-court "mechanical description of objects and body parts." However, in recognition 
of the personal nature of sexual matters and the pain associated with recounting such details, the tribunal 
opted for redefining rape. Specifically, many witnesses were not only reluctant to discuss such matters in 
the public setting of the court, but also were unable to "disclose graphic anatomical details of [the] sexual 
violence they endured."
  
108
Commentators have observed that Akayesu case put an indelible stamp on the Rome Statute even though 
the judgement was issued after Rome Statute had been adopted.  The original Akayesu indictment did not 
include charges relating to sexual violence crimes.  Questioning by the ICTR judges of prosecution 
witnesses appearing in that case revealed evidence of rape. 
  
109 Specifically, Judge Navanethem Pillay 
recognized the indicators of potential sexual violence and felt prompted to ask questions concerning these. 
As a result of evidence elicited by judicial questioning, the Prosecutor amended the indictment to include 
rape charges. 110
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In case law, as with the rape example above, judges are dependent on legitimated evidence (as truth) in 
order that there decision-making and adjudication on such evidentiary foundations can claim the 
legitimacy of truth. Once the judge, in our previous example, could not avoid the ‘truth’ within the victim 
testimonies on rape, he determined the witness words as confirming new elements of the crime and 
sought the charges to reflect this truth.  That left the question as to whether what the victim witnesses 
were recounting was truth against this evidentiary distinction.  The window as to what could constitute 
truth was opened by the judge.  Truth or not was in the voice of victim recall. 
In this regard, the legal professionals through the determination of what can constitute evidence, frame 
the reference for truthful witness testimony.  In the same sense the determination of what constitutes 
evidence, by lawyer and not witness, creates new levels of challenge for the emergence of truth through 
witness testimony, exacerbated in some cultural settings by the artificial strains of cross-
examination.111
The moral court and cosmopolitanism as a normative frame for truth and the 
protection of truth  
 
A cosmopolitan model of international trial decision-making wherein equality of standing should be the 
precursor of truthful witness testimony is not just an unrealistic normative frame.  True it is that classical 
notions of criminal responsibility in the common law sense celebrate the presumption that all are equal 
before the law and that the law will protect the truthful witness.  However, procedural reality constantly 
shores up the failings of this normative frame.  Due process protections for the accused, as an example, at 
the very least suggests the need to garner procedural advantage to limit the resource advantage of the 
prosecution, and to limit the trial contradictions assailing the presumption of innocence.
    Therefore, to assume that witness testimony is a free, individual, spontaneous, equally 
measured and uninhibited opportunity to tell the truth, as a cosmopolitan model of decision-making might 
anticipate, is not the reality of the international criminal trial setting. 
112
What ought to be (normative) and what are (practical) the legislative and procedural foundation of truth 
telling in tribunals and ICC should be critically evaluated outside cosmopolitan assertions, if the ‘moral’ 
epithet can attach to the court through procedural confirmation such as truthful oral testimony.   
  
As we will reveal in a later discussion of various witness types and their distinctly different (and partial) 
sourcing, it is fair to question whether it could truly be said of witnesses that they benefit from the 
'equality' afforded other stake-holders in the process.  Therefore, beyond cosmopolitan justice 
preferencing, whose rights are being protected through the adversarial contest of witness testimony? And 
is it sensible to assume that any strains and imbalances which might explain the ‘untruthful’ witnesses are 
merely an unfortunate and uncommon deviation from the cosmopolitan equality model, to be corrected by 
professional juridical intervention such as contempt proceedings? 
 
The moral standing of the ICC has been clearly identified as declaratory: the court as a moral teacher.113
                                                                                                                                                                                           
DePaul Law Review 2000  981; Matthew J. Burnett, ‘Remembering Justice in Rwanda: Locating Gender in the Judicial 
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111 (reference relating to indigenous witness testimony and problems with authority) 
112 Norrie (2001) chap 1 
113 Sylvia Ngane in her thesis ‘The position of witnesses before the International Criminal Court’  refers to ICC as a 
moral teacher. She argues that prosecution and sanctioning of international crimes in protecting and promotion of 
human life the Court stands as a moral teacher, not teaching only the respect of human life but in attempting to teach 
witnesses to provide truthful testimony.   There was the motivation from drafters of the Rome Statute to reflect the 
court as a moral teacher.  
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The didactic purpose of the trial as offering an end to impunity relies on cosmopolitan assumptions of 
equal treatment that are easily challenged right from the decision as to who should be prosecuted.  The 
first set of indictments issued out of the ICC at least, have the appearance of sectoral and sectarian 
considerations.  Some might say this is an obvious and unavoidable bi-product of the procedures for 
nation states to offer up (or not) the accused to the court.  That said, it does not answer the criticisms of 
the Palestinians as they try and garner ICC attention to west bank atrocities.  Nor does it clearly explain 
the differential methodology of the ICC prosecutor in investigating potential indictments in Columbia, 
against the aggressive assertions of jurisdiction in Sudan.114
Whatever the fundamental challenges to a cosmopolitan trial prosecution in the ICC, even were we to 
accept equality of arms up until the point of witness testimony, the responsibility then faces the legal 
professional as much as the individual witness in getting the story right, so that liability and deterrence 
may follow, and any didactic purpose be open to empirical assessment.  Cosmopolitan expectations for 
the trial could be  more conducive to truthful testimony and consequentially, trial outcomes which would 
have legitimacy and wider resonance.  It is the absence of essential cosmopolitan preconditions in practice, 
such as equally significant standing and understandings of victim witnesses against those of legal 
professionals concerning the purposes of oral testimony, which clearly tests that legitimacy and its 
didactic potential for victim communities from where the witnesses emerged.
 
115
 The Rome Statute constrains judicial decision-making to determining individual liability. As such, if 
moral law-making is to flow from ICC decision jurisprudence then it will need to rely on more than the 
uncertain didactic consequence of retributive sanction and punishment. Cosmopolitan pre-conditions of 
procedural equality, if strained or absent in the core process of oral witness testimony, will not of 
themselves sustain wider assertions concerning the moral court.  The focus on individual liability brings 
with it an associated interest in the power of the individual accuser and their testimony.  Again the wider 
legitimacy of this face-off is equality of arms in crucial aspects of truth-delivery, and a shared (if reluctant) 
appreciation of the purposes of the trial and its outcomes.  What we say later about contested victim 
witness interests clearly questions those considerations.  
  
Cosmopolitan justice forms are as much about justice being seen to be done, as justice in action.  If the 
moral court rests on cosmopolitan justice, the role witnesses are required to take up in the declaratory 
function of the court, is both symbolically and constitutionally critical. In ‘show trials’ the court presents 
a 'morality play' within which the witness is an essential player. In practice, where victim interest is 
contested, and constantly infuses the voice of testimony, does witness testimony mask the inequality and 
sectarian morality of the court's justice by having witness interests overshadowed, denied or even 
penalised in the legalist adversarial endeavour of getting at the ‘truth’? 
 
The problem of the moral court offering cosmopolitan justice could be reduced down to the realist or 
critical legal thinkers’ attack on natural law.  Mindful of this the advocates of the ICC as a moral court 
advance its claim on actual as well as normative fronts.116
                                                          
114  It might be argued that strategic interests of the USA, as much as the considerations of the Prosecutor, determine 
these different approaches.  And yet the latter is no doubt mindful of the former. 
 The critical reliance on proving truth through 
adversarial interrogation of oral testimony is claimed as practical evidence of the 
truth/judgement/morality nexus.  Interestingly, as demonstrated at least by the need for an adversary 
balance to witness testimony, the possibility of untruthful witnessing is recognized. But going much 
115 (victim interest survey reference) 
116 See Steven Roach, Governance, Order and the International Criminal Court (Oxford University press 2009); See 
Sylvia Ngane thesis ‘The position of Witnesses before the International Criminal Court’ (upcoming)      
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beyond that recognition could challenge the truthfulness of testimony at large and hence the moral nexus.  
In the following sections we will suggest that contempt proceedings might be the legalist check on at least 
untruthful testimony as a danger to judicial decision-making.  The limitations inherent in the contempt 
response, and the implicit appreciation by judges and prosecutors of wider-spread marginality in victim 
testimony perhaps explain its limited use in international trials, rather than the rarity of perjury.  
Prosecutors in particular appreciate partial victim interests get witnesses into the court-room even though 
these interests may taint truth. Judges discount rather than sanction witness story-telling.  And prosecutors 
know a vigorous application of contempt might simply further endanger the courts fragile legitimacy with 
potential witnesses much more than any challenge to its moral standing. 
Significance of a contempt sanction before the ICC - Symbol or practice? 
 
As suggested earlier, the credibility and integrity of ICC now clearly rests on its didactic (and consequent 
deterrent functions).  The impact of these in the wider victim community is tied to the perceived 
legitimacy of court decision-making.  On the moral and applied fronts, truthful witness testimony 
underpins credible judicial decision-making and the legitimacy which flows there-from.  In exploring the 
protections of truthful testimony, and contempt provisions in particular, we move the discussion of 
legitimacy from a general normative nexus, to practical procedural frames.  
At present the integrity of the court is argued for in its own terms - does it work with and produce truth? 
Introduces the fact that for a more functional notion of legitimacy we need to think about how witnesses 
perceive their role, and the pressures they face to compromise the truth. 
It is clear in the essential international human rights instruments 117
However, both in legal and moral terms, trial justice needs to be premised on much more than simply 
whether the witness tells the truth or not.  Legality and morality in the trial context are deemed to rely on 
procedural protections of a variety of justice indicia, truth being one of these.  The significance of any 
procedural protection goes to their capacity to ensure foundational aims for the trial, and with the ICC 
these are both retributive and restorative.  The next few sections look at the dynamics of contempt as such 
a protection. 
 that conditions of trial fairness, 
principally represented in due process for the accused, identify justice in a procedural sense.  It is 
assumed in these instruments that investigation and trial procedure will produce truthful (or at least 
factually dominant) accusations.  For international criminal justice, the greater recognition of victim 
interests should not come at the cost of due process or accusatorial integrity.   Paradoxically, with the 
predominance of victim witnesses giving oral testimony before international criminal courts and tribunals, 
it could be said that these measures of trial fairness for the accused, rest in the hands of the victim, 
perilous that this condition might be. Victim witnesses and their standing in the court, beyond truth-telling, 
are now important for the fairness of international trial decision-making. 
Legitimacy through truth telling v the relevance and practice of contempt in 
the international tribunal jurisprudence.  
 
False testimony is an offence pursuant to Article 70(1) (a).  Before starting to testify at the ICC, the 
witness is informed of the sanctions applicable.118
                                                          
117 See the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Articles 10 and 11; International  Covenant on Civil and 
political Rights, Article 14; see also the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court 
 These provides for the Court to have jurisdiction over 
118  See Rule 66 (3). 
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offences against its administration of justice when committed intentionally: Giving false testimony when 
under an obligation pursuant to article 69, Paragraph 1, to tell the truth.119
 
 
Rule 165 sets out the Procedure for ‘investigation, prosecution and trial’ of offences against the 
administration of justice under Article 70. If conduct covered by Article 71 also constitutes one of the 
offences defined in Article 70, the Court shall proceed in accordance with Article 70 and Rules 162 to 
169.120
Similarly the ICTY/R Rule 91(B) provide that if a Chamber has strong ground for believing that a witness 
has knowingly and wilfully given false testimony, or at the request of a party, it may direct the Prosecutor 
to investigate the matter with a view to the preparation and submission of an indictment for false 
testimony. The ICTY Rule 91(G) provides more draconian punishment than the ICTR Rule 91 (G), ICTY 
Rule 91 provides that a witness who gives false testimony may be punished for perjury with a fine of up 
to 100, 000 Euros and or up to seven years imprisonment while the ICTR Rule 91 provides for a fine of 
up to USD 10,000 and or twelve months imprisonment.
   
121
Since its creation the ICTR has prosecuted only one witness for false testimony in Prosecutor v. GAA.
 In addition ICTY Rule 77 (G) of the Rules 
provides that the maximum penalty that may be imposed on a person found to be in contempt of the 
Tribunal shall be a term of imprisonment not exceeding seven years, or a fine not exceeding 100,000 
Euros, or both.   
122  
The accused was a protected witness who testified in Kamuhanda trial under the pseudonym GAA. GAA, 
admitted that he willingly gave the false testimony when he appeared before the Appeals Chamber on 18 
May 2005 in the case of Jean de Dieu Kamuhanda who appealed against his conviction and sentence. 123 
GAA was sentenced to nine months imprisonment for contempt of the Tribunal and false testimony under 
solemn declaration.124
Byron observes, the ICTR established pioneering jurisprudence when it tried, convicted, and sentenced a 
witness for committing perjury. This was the first such case in the history of both international tribunals. 
Similarly the ICTY convicted a potential witness Zuhdija Tabaković  in the Lukic et al case for contempt 
of the Tribunal Rule 77(A) and sentenced him to three months’ imprisonment.
 The Chamber held, false testimony under solemn declaration and contempt of the 
Tribunal as very grave offences, as they constitute a direct challenge to the integrity of the trial process.  
125 The witness in exchange 
for the sum of 1000 euros signed a false statement to be used by Milan Lukic defence in the Lukic et al 
case.126
                                                          
119 See Sylvia Ngane, Should the State bear the responsibility of imposing sanctions on its citizens who 
as witnesses commit crimes before the ICC? in Ralph Henham and Mark Findlay (editors) Exploring the 
Boundaries of International Criminal Justice (Ashgate publishers, forthcoming 2010) 
  
120 Rule 172  
121 See Micheal Bohlander, ‘International Criminal Tribunals  and Their Power to punish Contempt and False 
Testimony’, (2001)  12 Criminal Law Forum, 91, 95. 
122 The Prosecutor v. GAA JUDGEMENT and SENTENCE Case No. ICTR-07-90-R77 4, T.CH III December 2007 
(Hereinafter GAA JUDGEMENT and SENTENCE). 
123 See The Prosecutor v. GAA, Case No. ICTR-07-90-R77; Prosecutor v. Jean de Dieu Kamuhanda, Case No. 
ICTR-99-54A-A; The Prosecutor v. GAA JUDGEMENT and SENTENCE Case No. ICTR-07-90-R77 4, T.CH III 
December 2007, para 5. 
124 Ibid paras 12-13;   
125 Prosecutor v. Zuhdija Tabaković, Indictment, IT-98-32/1-R77.1; Prosecutor v. Zuhdija Tabaković Sentencing 
Judgement  Case No. IT-98-32/1-R77.1, 18 March 2010 para 19. 
126 Ibid see paras 5-7 
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The Ad hoc tribunals have been criticised for their handling of contempt cases with regards to perjured 
witnesses before them.  Critics have observed that so many times witnesses have come before these 
tribunals and provided false testimony and have not been prosecuted for contempt.127  It is still left to be 
seen if any witness will be prosecuted for untruthful testimony or contempt before the ICC.128
Prosecutorial tolerance of contempt and its impact on naive assumptions of a 
'moral court' 
 
As has been suggested earlier, the reliance of the prosecution on witnesses which are sourced for reasons 
incompatible with the commitment to truthful evidence delivery has led to distinct challenges concerning 
the integrity of oral testimony.  The emphasis on oral testimony in international criminal trials, and the 
predominance of victim witnesses means that without corroborating material or documentary evidence the 
prosecutor is a slave to the inducements surrounding the sourcing of witnesses, the cultural and contextual 
idiosyncrasies of how they negotiate truth, and the motivations effecting victim witnesses in the delivery 
of accusations against the accused.  
 
Within an adversarial system: of evidence delivery the strongest case wins. Fact rather than truth prevails, 
and if they correspond that is as much a consequence of witness commitment to truth-telling as it is to 
liberal evidentiary regulation.  Prosecutors may not share the interests of the witnesses they lead, but in 
international criminal trials with a strong emphasis on oral testimony and an ideological reliance on truth, 
prosecutors are more than mindful of the legitimacy conveyed to future witnesses through the 
examination process.  Judges assume that prosecutors lead truthful witnesses in large part, but as we have 
seen, both the process of witness sourcing and the over-reliance on partial victim witnesses has meant that 
prosecutors are hard pressed to guarantee this outcome. 
Conventional procedural protections of truthful testimony, such as contempt prosecutions can be used in 
the international criminal trial to guard against perjury and protect the truth on which the moral court 
relies.  In the face of epidemic and endemic untruthful testimony one might expect a flood of contempt 
actions.  It is not so.  The critic of the moral court is left to ask why should this be? 
The impact on moral court credibility and rule of law and legality posed not only by untruthful testimony 
but by the failure to sanction its occurrence reveals much about the standing of oral testimony in the 
practice of international criminal trials.  It would appear that the moral court cannot be measured against 
the certainty of adversarial truth telling, or by the prosecution of perjury. Some might say that we make to 
much of this because judges in the experience of the international criminal tribunals know where their 
witnesses are coming from and discount their evidence accordingly, as would happen to lesser degrees in 
domestic criminal trials.  The difference in international criminal justice is that the assertion of the moral 
court cannot rely on the discretionary filter of judicial pragmatism.  Were it so then the assumed nexus 
between truthful testimony, moral judging and trial legitimacy would be a case-by-case commodity. 
                                                          
127 See  Alexander Zahar, ‘The Problem of false Testimony at the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda,’,  in 
Andre Klip and Goran Sluiter eds., Annotated Leading Cases of International criminal Tribunals, Vol.25: the 
International Criminal tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia 2006-2007, (Intersentia, 2010)  available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1443124; see also Goran Sluiter, ‘The ICTY and Offences 
against the Administration of Justice’, (2004), Journal of International Criminal Justice, 631-641 at 637-641; 
William A. Schabas, The International Criminal Court: A Commentary on the Rome Statute (Oxford University 
Press 2010) pp.855-856. 
128 see Sylvia Ngane, Should the State bear the responsibility of imposing sanctions on its citizens who as 
witnesses commit crimes before the ICC? in Ralph Henham and Mark Findlay (editors) Exploring the 
Boundaries of International Criminal Justice (Ashgate publishers, forthcoming 2010) 
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 Conclusion 
This paper does not argue against the ICC as a moral court.129 It does not deny the possibility of 
the moral court role.  In fact, in other places we have argued that for international criminal 
justice to achieve its declaratory potential, it must transcribe to a much more value-focused 
normative framework in which criminal justice is seen as a good.130
Those who would like to see the international criminal trial remain a retributive endeavour 
reflecting the conventional features and characteristics of domestic trials are concerned that 
enhancing victim presence and standing within the international trial process will endanger its 
limited and potential moral legitimacy.  We have argued in other places
 We don’t even suggest that 
truthful witness testimony cannot justify the moral mission of the ICC through truthful 
foundations to judicial decision-making.  What we do say is that all this cannot be taken for 
granted either by the form of adversarial oral testimony, or the prospect of contempt prosecution 
inactive for similar reasons as to why oral testimony in international criminal trial falters. 
131
In the case of victim witnesses, the courts (and the judiciary in particular) are relying on the 
truth of oral testimony to found judicial decision-making and the consequential legitimacy of 
retributive justice.  This paper has exposed the claims made for the ICC in particular as a moral 
court to act as a bridge between legalist aims for the international criminal trial, and those which 
look more to peace-making and conflict resolution on which to found legitimacy.  The paper has 
demonstrated the practical fragility of truthful testimony (and its procedural protection) before 
the international criminal tribunals.  For this purpose the analysis has utilized the deep sectoral 
interests behind witness selection, enticement, proofing and examination to reveal why contempt 
for false testimony has not proved an attractive or viable guarantee of the moral court standing.  
This dialectic leaves critics of international trial justice to look more practically at the 
legitimators for the courts and tribunals not so much in their moral declaratory condition, but 
against their challenge to impunity, their retributive muscle and their restorative potential. 
 that it is the due 
process protections, and rights perspective of the international criminal trial which in fact argue 
for a greater integration of victim interest in trial decision-making.  However, the deep 
reservations expressed above regarding the actual impact of procedural protections over the 
veracity of witness testimony may challenge victim-centred justifications for the ICC, but not 
because of goal based legitimacy fears.  Rather it is the failure to ensure truth through the 
adversarial process which may challenge moral court legitimacy at large.  And counter-
intuitively a more vigorous attitude to procedural protection in the form of contempt 
prosecutions of untruthful victim witnesses may go to challenge victim cooperation with the 
court, and consequent legitimacy for victim-communities. 
Despite legalist narrow assertions that enjoy the moral court discourse and the declaratory role 
of trial justice, the ICC, and its prosecutor, have claimed more universalist justifications in the 
form of the court’s potential to assisting in state reconstruction and peace-making. Further, the 
ICC, and the international tribunals which preceded it, have within their authorising legislation a 
growing recognition of victim interests, even if this remains largely outside the processes of trial 
                                                          
129 Steven Roach in Governance, Order and the International Criminal Court (Oxford University press 2009)    
argues  that  A negative global responsibility needs to be distinguished from a positive global responsibility, which 
refers to shared open-ended duty to promote the universal morality of the Court. He comments on the ICC’s 
evolving role in expanding institutional network of global justice the court open-ended positive global responsibility 
to promote universal norms and morality, or the cosmopolitan principles of fairness and equality.  See pp2-3 
130 Findlay & Henham (2010) intro 
131 Findlay & Henham (2005) (2010) 
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decision-making. The paper ponders whether, through the compromised and conflicting 
incentives given to victim witnesses to testify, and the possibility of contempt prosecution for 
partial story-telling, the power of victims to legitimate the court will be seriously damaged by 
first-hand encounters with retributive, adversarial justice. 
Further, victim witnesses and the communities they represent will not be convinced or 
comforted by moral court assertions if they leave their encounters with examination and judicial 
decision-making with feelings of confusion and betrayal.  It is one things for international 
criminal judges to expect truthful testimony, and quite another for prosecutors to turn a blind 
eye to the conflict of interest between witness motivations for testimony and judicial 
expectations of truth. 
And what is truth in any case, if when perjury is identified the courts are unwilling to prosecute 
for a variety of ancillary reasons which may expose the problematic relationship between 
witness positioning and ‘truth-telling’ in the international trial process? If witnesses were 
expected to be no more than truthful, and they understand and accept this responsibility along 
with the legal professionals charged with proofing their testimony, then every violation of this 
duty would be visited with contempt prosecution.  The paper demonstrates this not to be the case.  
Such a reluctance to put the motivations for compromised testimony before open prosecution 
and adjudication speaks volumes about the tissue-thin nexus between witness testimony, 
adversarial truth, legitimate judicial decision-making and the moral court.  Behind the question 
‘why so few contempt prosecutions’ is not an indictment of the deterrent value of contempt 
proceedings, but rather of the legitimate expectation for oral testimony.  It is an indictment of 
simplistic claims that oral testimony, distilled through adversarial examination, will result in 
‘truth’ which endorses the adjudication of a moral court. 
The paper stops short of alleging that through:  
• the suspect ways in which witnesses are channelled into testimony,  
• the confusion in the minds of witnesses about the interests they advance, and in fact  
• the truth they represent,  
that the court colludes in its own ‘immorality’.  Attempts by judges in particular to identify 
competing victim interests which may undermine truthful testimony, show a genuine desire 
to find out what challenges the truth/legitimacy/morality nexus. What the analysis suggests 
is that a purely legalist justification, based on the declaratory morality of the  court as its 
proper aim,132
  
 
 is flawed if it relies on untested assumptions about honest testimony and the 
protections of adversarial examination, and contempt to ensure the legitimacy of judicial 
decision-, and thereby moral international trial justice. We conclude the claims to legitimacy 
and morality cannot automatically and uncritically flow from assumptions of adversarial 
truth, but more convincingly vest in recognizing and working with legitimate victim witness 
expectations for trial justice, as well as the part they play within it. 
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